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Abstract This paper introduces the possibility of signaling into a fi nite-depositor version of the 
Diamond-Dybvig model. More precisely, the decision to keep the funds in the bank is assumed 
to be unobservable, but depositors are allowed to make it observable by signaling, at a cost. 
Depositors consecutively decide whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding balances 
in the bank, and they choose if they want to signal the latter decision. If the cost of signaling is 
moderate, then bank runs do not occur. Moreover, in the unique outcome no signals are made, 
so the unconstrained-effi cient allocation is implemented without any costs.
© 2010 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Un modelo de Diamond y Dybvig sin pánico bancario: el poder de la señalización
Resumen El presente trabajo introduce la posibilidad de la señalización en una versión del 
modelo de Diamond y Dybvig con un número limitado de depositantes. Más concretamente, 
se presupone que la decisión de mantener los fondos en el banco no es observable, pero los 
depositantes pueden hacerlo mediante la señalización, que estaría sujeta a un coste. Los 
depositantes deciden de forma consecutiva si desean retirar sus fondos o seguir manteniendo 
saldos en el banco, así como si desean señalizar esta última decisión. Si el coste de señal-
ización es reducido, no tiene lugar el pánico bancario. Por otra parte, no se emite ninguna 
señal en el único equilibrio, por ello se aplica la asignación efi ciente sin restricciones sin que 
suponga ningún coste.
© 2010 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
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1. Introduction
During the recent financial turmoil several banks in 
developed countries have experienced runs. In 2007, the 
bank run on Northern Rock in the UK heralded the oncoming 
crisis, and several other banks suffered runs, such as the 
Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong and the Washington Mutual in 
the USA. Non-bank institutions, like investment funds, have 
also experienced massive withdrawals very similar to bank 
runs. Examples include the collapse of Bear Stearns and the 
temporary suspension of redemptions in the Spanish real 
estate investment fund, Banif Inmobiliario.
Media coverage showing the lines in front of bank offi ces 
might have infl uenced the evolution of these runs. In general, 
the information that depositors have about the underlying 
situation seems to be crucial to understand how bank runs 
emerge. Descriptions of the banking panics in the nineteenth 
century (Sprague, 1910) or in the 1930s (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1971; Wicker, 2001) indicate that panic episodes 
lasted for months and withdrawals did not start at once 
in each panic-stricken region, so depositors might have 
information about what happened elsewhere. Starr and 
Yilmaz (2007) analyze a bank-run episode which affected 
Turkey’s Islamic financial houses in 2001. They study the 
behavior of different-sized depositors (small, medium and 
large) and fi nd that depositors were responsive to their peers 
and to behavior of depositors of other groups. Iyer and Puri 
(2008) examine depositor-level data for a bank that faced 
a run in India in 2001, finding that social network effects 
were important regarding depositors’ decision-making. This 
evidence suggests that information about other depositors’ 
choices is important to understand how bank runs arise.
However, the idea of having information about other 
depositors’ decisions is mostly absent in the theoretical 
literature. In the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), depositors play a simultaneous-move game, without 
knowing anything about other depositors’ decisions. There 
are two equilibria: one without a bank run and another in 
which all depositors (independently of their liquidity needs) 
rush to withdraw their funds. If the bank applies suspension 
of convertibility, then bank runs can be eliminated. 
Suspension of convertibility allows the bank to suspend 
the payment to withdrawing depositors if their number 
surpasses a certain threshold. By suspending the payment, 
the bank guarantees that there will be suffi cient funds to 
pay a high consumption in the next period relative to the 
available immediate consumption. Therefore, depositors 
without immediate liquidity needs (patient depositors) 
have no incentives to withdraw and a run will never start. 
Only depositors that have urgent liquidity needs (impatient 
depositors) withdraw their funds. Ennis and Keister (2009a) 
show that suspension of convertibility may fall prey to time 
inconsistency and ex post is not an effi cient instrument to 
prevent bank runs. The question as to whether coordination 
failures leading to bank runs in the Diamond-Dybvig model 
can be avoided or not has yet to be answered. 1
In this paper, we show that bank runs in the Diamond-Dybvig 
model may be prevented by enhancing the observability of 
depositors’ actions. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
bank-run models generally use a simultaneous-move 
framework, implying that depositors do not observe any 
decisions. Nevertheless, to some extent, banks are able to 
observe depositors’ decisions. Peck and Shell (2003) claim 
that the most natural assumption is that only withdrawals 
are observed by the bank, since depositors do not go to the 
bank and say that they do not want to withdraw. Green and 
Lin (2000, 2003) assume that each depositor contacts the 
bank and communicates her decision to withdraw or keep 
the money deposited. We combine these two views and 
suppose that withdrawals are observable, whereas waitings 
are not. 2
However, waitings can be made observable, at a cost. 
Thus, a depositor who decides to wait can send a signal 
to the bank revealing its decision. Upon observing the 
depositor’s decision, the bank communicates it to those 
who are still to make a decision, which is an important point 
for our study. Our approach is in line with Nosal and Wallace 
(2009) who consider a general information setup in which 
depositors do not only know their liquidity preferences, but 
any information that the bank chooses to communicate to 
them (e.g. the depositor’s place in the sequence of decisions 
or preceding depositors’ decisions).
In our model, depositors consecutively decide according 
to an exogenously given sequence of decisions. 3
Each depositor can either withdraw, wait and signal, or 
wait without signaling. Sending the signal is costly, but a 
waiting signal may induce subsequent patient depositors to 
wait as well. We show that as the game unfolds, signaling 
strictly dominates withdrawal for any patient depositor. 
As a consequence, patient depositors know that no other 
patient depositor would withdraw given the information sets 
that may arise, so they choose to wait without signaling. 
Therefore, the unconstrained-efficient allocation is 
implemented without costs. The intuition behind the result 
is that signaling is needed to make withdrawal a strictly 
dominated action, but once it is, signaling becomes strictly 
dominated as well.
Our assumption about signaling the decision to wait fi ts 
into the existing bank-run literature, as explained above. 
Signaling - as seen in this paper - is not a standard practice in 
fi nancial intermediation. However, with recent technological 
advances it may not just be a theoretical instrument but a 
practical one in the future. Signaling can also be seen as a 
metaphor of intense communication between the bank and 
its depositors.
1.1. Related literature
In this section, we survey the bank-run literature focusing 
on the information that the depositors and the bank have.
As indicated before, in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
depositors simultaneously decide and then those who want 
to withdraw have the possibility to contact the bank in 
a random sequence of decisions. Bank runs may occur in 
1. In Section 1.1 we review in depth the literature and claim 
that this is not clear either in the Diamond-Dybvig model or in the 
literature.
2. We use “keeping the money deposited” and “waiting”
in an interchangeable manner. 
3. This assumption is usual in the literature. See Green and Lin 
(2000, 2003), Andolfatto et al. (2007) or Ennis and Keister (2009b).
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equilibrium, unless a suspension of convertibility clause 
is included in the demand-deposit contract. This clause is 
dynamically inconsistent (Ennis and Keister, 2009a), meaning 
that the question as to whether bank runs are avoidable in 
the Diamond-Dybvig setup is yet to be answered.
Compared to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the main 
modification by Peck and Shell (2003) is that the share 
of liquidity types (patient vs. impatient) is not fi xed, but 
the realization of types is independent across depositors. 
Hence, there is aggregate uncertainty regarding the number 
of patient and impatient depositors. Depositors do not have 
any information about other depositors’ decisions, they 
only know their own liquidity type. In this environment, 
bank runs constitute an equilibrium outcome. Both Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) and Peck and Shell (2003) assume that 
only depositors who wish to withdraw contact the bank. In 
this paper, patient depositors who decide to wait have the 
opportunity to contact the bank.
Green and Lin (2000, 2003) build a model with aggregate 
uncertainty about liquidity types and introduce two novel 
elements. First, each depositor is assumed to contact the 
bank during the early period according to an exogenous 
sequence of decisions, not only those who attempt to 
withdraw. Second, depositors have information about their 
position in the sequence of decisions. These changes allow 
them to show that bank runs do not occur in equilibrium. 
Notice that in spite of knowing the position in the 
sequence of decisions, the game is simultaneous in the 
game-theoretical sense.
Andolfatto et al. (2007) report a model inspired by Green 
and Lin (2003) with an essential modification. The bank 
informs each depositor of the complete history of actions 
taken by the preceding depositors. Using the independence 
assumption about type realization, they show that any 
implementable allocation is also strictly implementable, so 
bank runs do not arise. However, in Andolfatto et al. (2007) 
observing previous choices is not important, because any 
patient depositor prefers to keep her money deposited if 
all subsequent patient depositors do so. Hence, whether 
previous withdrawals were due to real liquidity needs 
or to panicking patient depositors, it does not affect the 
optimal decision. Even if all previous patient depositors 
have withdrawn, waiting is optimal for a patient depositor 
provided that the remaining patient depositors wait. In our 
paper, optimal choice depends on the history and a patient 
depositor who infers that withdrawals by patient depositors 
occurred may fi nd it optimal to withdraw.
This difference is due to the different nature of the 
unconstrained-efficient allocations in models with and 
without aggregate uncertainty. When the share of different 
liquidity needs in the population is uncertain, the bank 
takes into account each additional piece of information 
that is revealed by the depositors’ actions. Thus, the 
bank “reoptimizes” the allocation after each decision 
and depositors of the same liquidity type end up with 
different consumptions, depending on their position and 
the earlier choices. As a consequence, optimal decisions 
only depend on subsequent depositors’ choices. In the 
other case (as Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, or this paper), 
the unconstrained-effi cient allocation is independent of the 
choices: depositors who make the same decision receive 
the same consumption (unless the bank’s funds become 
exhausted). Therefore, upon observing many withdrawals a 
patient depositor may infer that the number of those who 
wait will not be suffi cient to yield a period-2 consumption 
that is higher than the consumption related to immediate 
withdrawal. In this case, it is optimal to withdraw.
Gu (2010) incorporates the idea of observability into her 
model, and focuses on a signal extraction problem in which 
depositors try to fi nd out whether the bank has fundamental 
problems or not. She disregards bank runs that are due to 
coordination failures, and studies the cases when previous 
withdrawals (possibly made by sophisticated depositors) 
are a signal of bad fundamentals. Our interest lies in 
investigating whether some information structures eliminate 
the coordination problems that result in bank runs, meaning 
that our focus is therefore different from Gu’s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes the model, illustrates the main idea 
through an example and leads to the results. Section 
3 provides a conclusion.
2. The model
Our model builds on the seminal paper by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983). There are three time periods denoted 
by t = 0,1,2 and a finite set of depositors denoted by 
I = {1,…,N}, where N > 2. Depositor i’s consumption in period 
t is denoted by ct,i [ R+, and her liquidity type by ui. It is 
a binomial random variable with support given by the set 
of liquidity types Q = {0,1}. If ui = 0, depositor i is called 
impatient, and is only concerned about consumption at 
t = 1. If ui = 1, depositor i is called patient. Depositor i’s 
utility function is given by
u(c1,i,c2,i,ui) = u(c1,i + uic2,i) (1)
It is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, 
twice continuously differentiable and to satisfy the Inada 
conditions. The relative risk-aversion coeffi cient is —ciu″(ci)/
u′(ci) > 1, for any ct,i[ R+, and all i[N.
The number of patient depositors is assumed to be 
constant and given by p[[1,N]. The remaining depositors 
are impatient. Hence, there is no aggregate uncertainty 
about types in this model, and the number of patient and 
impatient depositors is assumed to be common knowledge.
At t = 0, each depositor i[I has one unit of a homogeneous 
good which she deposits in the bank, to be defi ned below. 
The bank has access to a constant-returns-to-scale 
production function which pays a gross return of one unit 
for each endowment liquidated at t = 1, and a fi xed return 
of R > 1 for each endowment liquidated at t = 2.
2.1. The effi cient allocation and the bank
If a benevolent social planner observed each depositor’s 
liquidity type, then she could maximize the sum of 
depositors’ utilities with respect to c1,i and c2,i subject to 
a resource constraint and p. Since depositors differ only 
in their types, in the optimal situation, those of the same 
type receive the same consumption. Therefore, henceforth 
we suppress the subindex i and use c1 and c2. This fi rst-best 
allocation solves
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maxc1,c2 (N — p)u(c1) + pu(c2)
s.t. (2)
(N — p)c1  + (pc2/R) = N.
The solution to this problem is
u′(c1*) = Ru′(c2*) (3)
which — as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) — implies that 
R > c*2 > c1* > 1. Therefore, patient depositors receive a 
higher consumption than impatient ones. This solution is 
the unconstrained-efficient allocation. It offers liquidity 
insurance, because the amount of consumption given to an 
impatient depositor is higher than that in autarky. 4
At t = 0, the depositors form a bank by pooling their 
initial endowments. The bank insures against the privately 
observed liquidity risk, which is only realized at the 
beginning of t = 1, by offering a simple demand-deposit 
contract that implements the unconstrained-efficient 
allocation, as is shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The 
simple demand-deposit contract offers to pay c*1 to any 
depositor i who withdraws at t = 1 as long as the bank has 
funds. Any patient depositor i who waits until t = 2 receives 
a pro rata share of the funds available then. Let h [ [0,p] 
be the number of depositors who wait at t = 1. Given h, 
depositor i’s consumption at t = 2 is
 (4)
If h = p, that is, only impatient depositors withdraw at 
t = 1, then c2(h) = c2* and patient depositors enjoy a higher 
consumption than impatient ones.
However, if h is too low, then it is also better for patient 
depositors to withdraw at t = 1 since waiting until t = 2 
yields strictly less than c*1. As such, if the number of patient 
depositors who keep the money in the bank is below h, a 
threshold value for h, then their period-2 consumption is 
strictly below c*1. The threshold value h is derived formally 
in Lemma 1 whose proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1: There exists 1 ≤ h ≤ p such that for all i[N,
c2(h — 1) < c*1, for any h ≤ h — 1, and
c*1 ≤ c2 (h), for any h ≥ h  (5)
Note that h is only known at the end of period 1, after 
each depositor has decided. Yet depositors have to guess 
its value as it is their turn to choose, based on the available 
information.
2.2. Decisions and signaling
Depositors decide in an exogenously given sequence 
of decisions. Let QN = {0,1}N be the set of all possible 
sequences of depositors and let uN = (u1,…,uN)[QN denote 
the realized sequence. There are ⎛N⎞
⎝p⎠
possible sequences of 
length N with p patient depositors. Suppose that each 
of them is selected by a random process with some 
probability. The realized sequence cannot be observed by 
the depositors or by the bank and depositors do not know 
their position in the sequence. As usual in the literature 
(Wallace, 1988), depositors are isolated and no trade can 
occur among them in period 1.
We assume that waitings are unobservable (as in Peck 
and Shell [2003]) but we allow (but do not require) patient 
depositors to signal their waiting. The available actions 
are withdraw (w), wait without signaling (k), wait and 
signal (r). 5 The difference between the last two lies in the 
observability. When a depositor signals, her decision to wait 
becomes visible to the bank, and in turn to the depositors, 
since the bank shares the available information with them. 
Since signaling to the bank in period 1 is not related to 
consumption, we allow for the possibility that it is costly. 
There is a non-negative and uniform signaling cost in utility 
terms and it is denoted by j. 6
Assumption 1: u(c2*) — u(c1*) > j
If the opposite were to occur, then the cost would be so 
high that it does not compensate for the potential gain in 
utility. To make signaling a real option we use assumption 1 
throughout the paper. Intuitively, a patient depositor would 
prefer to signal, because sending this signal could induce 
subsequent patient depositors not to withdraw, and have a 
high period-2 consumption.
Note that to signal and withdraw does not make sense, 
because withdrawal implies immediate consumption and 
signaling does not affect the amount of this consumption. 
Moreover, it is costly. For this reason, we disregard the 
possibility of withdrawing and signaling.
Depositors are naturally called one-by-one to decide 
according to uN. Depositors only observe the information 
that the bank provides about previous choices that can be 
observed. We suppose that the time elapsed in period 1 is 
not informative. As a consequence neither the bank, nor the 
depositors can fi nd out the number of depositors who have 
waited without signaling based on the elapsed time and the 
number of withdrawals.
To illustrate the game consider the following example.
2.3. An example
There are four depositors, three patients and one impatient. 
Suppose that all patient depositors have to keep the money 
in the bank to make waiting worthwhile (h = 3). Since waiting 
without signaling is unobservable, there is uncertainty about 
the position in the sequence. Suppose that
u(c2(h)) > u(c1*) for h = 3,
 (6)
u(c1*) > u(c2(h)) for h ≤ 2.
so patient depositors only prefer not to withdraw if all the 
other patient depositors do so as well.
4. In autarky, an impatient depositor earns the unit gross return at 
t = 1, while a patient depositor earns R at t = 2.
5. Occasionally, to the last action we will simply refer as signaling.
6. How costly is signaling in real life? Our guess is that they it 
is rather low cost as a consequence of technological advances 
like Internet banking. Notice that in Green and Lin (2003) each 
depositor has to contact the bank (even if she waits) and contacting 
is not costly.
c2(h) =
max 
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
R(N — (N — h)c1*)
h
⎧
⎨0,
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
if h > 0
0 if h = 0.
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Consider the observable history (r), that is, a depositor 
observes that somebody has sent a signal. This history 
is compatible with being at position 2 and 3. A patient 
depositor observing it may believe the following: (i) she is 
at position 3 and — besides the depositor who signaled — she 
was preceded by a patient depositor who waited without 
signaling; (ii) the observed history coincides with the 
truthful history, so she is the second to decide. Clearly, if 
the history also included an unobserved waiting, then the 
best solution for a patient depositor is to wait without 
signaling. In the other case, signaling strictly dominates 
withdrawal, because the last patient depositor would 
observe two signals which would make her wait and the 
signaling depositor would have u(c2*) — j > u(c1*). Therefore, 
a patient depositor observing a signal would not withdraw. 
As a consequence, when observing (r,w) any depositor knows 
that the withdrawal must have been due to the impatient 
depositor. As such, signaling strictly dominates withdrawal 
for a patient depositor observing this history. Since no 
patient depositor withdraws when observing (r,w), the 
best response is to wait without signaling. Anticipating this 
decision, a patient depositor’s best response to observing 
(r) is also to wait without signaling.
Let us see what happens if a patient depositor observes 
(w). We have seen that when the history begins with a 
signal, then no subsequent patient depositor will withdraw. 7 
Consequently, signaling strictly dominates withdrawal for a 
patient depositor who observes nothing, so this depositor 
will not withdraw. Therefore, if a observable history begins 
with a withdrawal, it must have been the choice of the 
impatient depositor. When observing (w,r) signaling strictly 
dominates withdrawal, since when there are two signals 
in any observable history, then the next patient depositor 
(if there is any) will wait without signaling. Again, since 
the unique impatient depositor has already withdrawn and 
no patient depositor observing (w,r) withdraws, the best 
response is to wait without signaling. It also implies that 
when observing (w) signaling strictly dominates withdrawal, 
because the ensuing information sets surely lead to higher 
consumptions than c1*. Moreover, waiting without signaling 
is the best response, because when observing a withdrawal, 
a patient depositor knows that it was performed by an 
impatient depositor and if there are any subsequent patient 
depositors, then those depositors will not withdraw.
As we have seen, if a patient depositor does not observe 
anything, then she will not withdraw. Nor will she signal, since 
for a patient depositor the best response to the observable 
history (w) is to wait without signaling. As a consequence, 
the best response to observing nothing is to wait without 
signaling, because it leads to the unconstrained-effi cient 
allocation and does not entail costs. Hence, when observing 
either nothing or (w) the best response is to wait without 
signaling, so as the game unfolds patient depositors wait 
without signaling and the fi rst best obtains.
The intuition behind the result is that signaling is needed 
to make withdrawal a strictly dominated action, but once 
it is strictly dominated, signaling also becomes strictly 
dominated.
2.4. The general case
The information set consists of the own type and the 
history which is observable. Given that waitings cannot be 
observed, a depositor observing any history does not know 
her position with certainty. If she observes v withdrawals 
and r signals, then she only knows that she is at least in 
position v + r + 1 and at most in position v + p. The range of 
possible positions is p-r-1 which makes position uncertainty 
eventually quite large.
We denote by Hobsv,r the set of observed histories containing 
any permutation of v[{0,1,2,…n — 1} withdrawals and 
r[{0,1,2,…p — 1} signals. An element in this set is denoted 
by hobsv,r Notice that it is possible that two (or even more) 
patient depositors observe the same observable history.
A p u r e  s t r a t e g y  f o r  a  d e p o s i t o r  i s  a  m a p 
s(u,Hobs) : {0,1} × Hobs → {w,k,r}, where Hobs = × (hobsv,r )vP{0,1,2…n—1}
rP{0,1,2…p—1}
is the set of all possible observable histories. Therefore, 
each depositor has to specify what to do when observing any 
possible history and being of either type. We have suppressed 
the subindex i to stress that position is unknown. We focus 
on patient depositors, because impatient depositors always 
withdraw.
We show that the game has a unique outcome using 
iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
Proposition 1. Signaling dominates withdrawal for 
patient depositors for any observable history starting 
with r [ [0,p — 1] signals and followed by v [ [1,n — p] 
withdrawals.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proof results from the interaction of two elements: 
truthful histories and histories that start with signals. An 
observable history is truthful if no patient depositor has 
withdrawn.
If a history begins with p—1 signals, then a patient depositor 
knows that she is the last patient depositor in the sequence 
and her dominant strategy is to wait. Moreover, for patient 
depositors waiting it is the dominant strategy for any history 
that contains p—1 signals. Note that a patient depositor 
observing any history with p—1 signals and v [ [1,n — p] 
withdrawals infers that the history is truthful.
Now consider a history that begins with p—2 signals. 
A patient depositor observing this history knows that she 
is the (p—1)th patient depositor in the sequence. For 
this patient depositor signaling dominates withdrawal, 
because u(c2*) — j > u(c1*). 8 If a patient depositor observes 
a history that begins with p—2 signals and is followed by 
a withdrawal, then she knows that the withdrawal has 
been due to an impatient depositor and that she is the 
(p—1)th patient depositor in the sequence. Signaling 
dominates withdrawal, since it yields a truthful history with 
p—1 signals that induces the last patient depositor to wait. 
Given this argument, upon observing a history that begins 
with p—2 signals and is followed by two withdrawals a 
7. A patient depositor would best respond by withdrawing to an 
observable history (r,w,w), but by our previous arguments it cannot 
arise.
8. Note that by signaling she causes the last patient depositor 
to wait, since the last patient depositor will observe p—1 signals 
and her best response is to wait. As a consequence, all patient 
depositors wait, yielding period-2 consumption c*2 for all of them.
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patient depositor infers that only impatient depositors have 
withdrawn and that she is the (p—1)th patient depositor in 
the sequence. Signaling dominates withdrawal for the same 
reasons as before. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, we 
conclude that for any history beginning with p—2 signals 
for a patient depositor signaling dominates withdrawal. 
Furthermore, for any truthful history containing p—2 signals 
signaling dominates withdrawal. This is the case because 
by signaling a truthful history with p—1 signals is generated 
and by previous results we know that there are therefore no 
patient depositor withdraws.
Consider a history that begins with p—3 signals. A patient 
depositor observing this history knows that she is the 
(p—2)th patient depositor in the sequence. Signaling dominates 
withdrawal for this patient depositor, because that would 
yield a truthful history with p—2 signals that — by previous 
arguments — leads to the utility of u(c2*) — j > u(c1*). Then, 
when observing a history that begins with p—3 signals and is 
followed by a withdrawal, a patient depositor knows that it 
is a truthful history, so signaling dominates withdrawal. This 
line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that for any history 
beginning with p—3 signals, signaling dominates withdrawal 
for a patient depositor. Moreover, for any truthful history 
containing p—3 signals signaling dominates withdrawal.
By repeating the same procedure with histories that begin 
with fewer signals, we obtain Proposition 1.
A direct consequence of the proposition is the following 
theorem.
Theorem 1. The unconstrained-efficient allocation is 
strongly implementable.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 1 implies that a patient depositor does 
not withdraw when observing zero signals followed by 
v [ [1,n — p] withdrawals. As a consequence, in whatever 
position the first patient depositor arrives, she will not 
withdraw. She will not signal either, because even if the 
next patient depositor only observes the withdrawals of the 
impatient depositors, she will not withdraw either. In fact, 
this is the case for any subsequent patient depositor, so the 
optimal decision is to wait without signaling.
Theorem 1 predicts a unique game outcome in which 
patient depositors do not signal. Signaling makes withdrawal 
a strictly dominated strategy, and once withdrawals can only 
be due to impatient depositors there is no need to incur the 
cost of signaling. The possibility of signaling can be seen as 
richer communication between the bank and its depositors. 
This result is in line with the fi ndings of Iyer and Puri (2008) 
which state that the longer and deeper the relationship 
between a depositor and the bank, the less likely it is that 
the depositor participates in a run.
3. Conclusion
Most of the bank-run literature uses a simultaneous-move 
approach to model depositors’ decisions in spite of contrary 
empirical evidence. To make the informational structure 
richer, we have introduced two elements. We allowed the 
bank to share information with depositors about previous 
decisions and we allowed depositors who decide to wait 
to signal their decision to the bank at a cost (and through 
the bank to subsequent depositors). We find that in our 
environment bank runs do not occur. Moreover, in the unique 
outcome no signals are made, so the unconstrained-effi cient 
allocation obtains.
Although we do not explicitly study policy issues, our 
result has a clear policy message. Observing others’ 
decisions is important in depositors’ decision-making and 
communication structures allowing better information fl ow, 
which may help to avoid unjustifi ed bank runs.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Lemma 1: There exists a 1 ≤ h ≤ p such that for all i [ N,
c2(h — 1) < c*1 for any h ≤ h — 1
 and (7)
c*1 < c2(h) for any h ≤ h.
Proof. Note that int( n
c*1
), which is the integer part of ( n
c*1
) 
is the maximum number of depositors to whom the bank is 
able to pay c*1. Since 1 < c*1, we have that int(
n
c*1
) < n. That 
is, the bank cannot pay in period 1 to all depositors c*1, since 
it has only n units of deposits. Hence, for any h < n — int( n
c*1
), 
c2(h) = 0. Therefore, if the number of withdrawals is too 
high, the bank’s funds become exhausted and it cannot pay 
anything to those who have waited.
On the other hand, c*2 = c2(p) and c2 (x — 1) < c2(x) for any 
n — int( n
c*1
) < x — 1 < p, so given 
c2(h) < c*1 < c*2 = c2(p) for ; h < n — int(
n
c*1
)  (8)
there is a unique h such that for any h ≤ h we have c*1 < c2(h), 
whereas for any h ≤ h we have c2(h) < c*1.
Appendix B
The following defi nition will prove convenient for the proof.
Defi nition 1. An observable history is truthful if no patient 
depositor has withdrawn.
First, we show that if signaling dominates withdrawal for a 
patient depositor upon observing a truthful history with x 
signals then it occurs also when observing a truthful history 
with x-1 signals.
Lemma 2: Suppose that signaling strictly dominates 
withdrawal for patient depositors when observing a truthful 
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history with r signals. Then, signaling strictly dominates 
withdrawal when observing a truthful history with 
r—1 signals.
Proof. The assumption that signaling strictly dominates 
withdrawal when observing a truthful history with r 
signals implies that at the end of period 1 the amount of 
non-withdrawals is such that u(c2*) — j > u(c1*). When a 
patient depositor observes a truthful history with r—1 
signals, then by signaling she can generate a truthful history 
with r signals and as a consequence she can ensure to have 
utility u(c2*) — j > u(c1*). Therefore, signaling in this case 
strictly dominates withdrawal.
In the next step, we show how proceeding from the end of 
the sequence of decisions we can determine if a history is 
truthful or not.
Lemma 3: Suppose that signaling strictly dominates withdrawal 
when observing a truthful history with r signals. Then, any 
history beginning with r—1 signals is a truthful history.
Proof. First consider the history consisting of r—1 signals. 
By defi nition, it must be a truthful history. Furthermore, 
a patient depositor observing this history prefers signaling 
over withdrawal by Lemma 2. Then consider the history that 
begins with r—1 signals followed by a withdrawal. Since 
a patient depositor would not withdraw upon observing 
r—1 signals, the withdrawal must be due to an impatient 
depositor, so this history is truthful as well. By applying 
Lemma 2 we know that given this history signaling strictly 
dominates withdrawal. As a consequence, when observing 
the history that begins with r—1 signals followed by two 
withdrawals, depositors infer that the withdrawals have 
been made by impatient depositors, so this history is 
truthful as well. By repeating this reasoning, we fi nd that 
any history that begins with r—1 signals and is followed by 
v [ [1,n — p] withdrawals is a truthful history.
We put now the two lemmas to work. Consider a 
patient depositor who observes any history that contains 
p—1 signals. The histories are truthful since all the other 
patient depositors have signaled and clearly signaling 
strictly dominates withdrawal. By Lemma 2, signaling 
strictly dominates withdrawal for patient depositors when 
observing a truthful history with p—2 signals and by lemma 3 
any history beginning with p—2 signals must be a truthful 
history. Therefore, signaling strictly dominates withdrawal 
for patient depositors for any history beginning with p—2 
signals and followed by v [ [1,n — p] withdrawals.
By applying Lemma 2 again, signaling will strictly 
dominate withdrawal for patient depositors when observing 
a truthful history with p—3 signals and Lemma 3 implies that 
any history beginning with p—3 signals must be a truthful 
history. Hence, signaling strictly dominates withdrawal for 
patient depositors for any history beginning with p—3 signals 
and followed by v [ [1,n — p] withdrawals.
Applying the two lemmas repeatedly yields Proposition 1.
Proposit ion 1.  S ignal ing dominates withdrawal 
for patient depositors for any observable history 
starting with r [ [0,p — 1] signals and followed by 
v [ [1,n — p] withdrawals.
Appendix C
We begin with the defi nition of strong implementability in 
our setup.
Definition 2. The unconstrained-efficient allocation is 
strongly implementable if for all patient depositors, 
s(u = 1,Hobs) = k is the unique strategy profi le that survives 
the process of iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
In the proof of the theorem, we show that as the game un-
folds, patient depositors will face observable histories for 
which, according to Proposition 1, signaling strictly dominates 
withdrawal. Patient depositors realize that by waiting without 
signaling all subsequent patient depositors will see observable 
histories that make them abstain from withdrawing. Hence, 
the optimal action is to wait without signaling.
Theorem 1: The unconstrained-efficient allocation is 
strongly implementable.
Proof. By proposition 1, for any history beginning with 
r [ [0,p — 1] signals and followed by v [ [1,n — p] withdrawals 
signaling strictly dominates withdrawal. As a consequence, 
if a patient depositor observes any of these histories 
the optimal decision for her is k, because even though 
subsequent patient depositors do not observe her signal, 
they will observe a history that makes her to wait without 
signaling. Hence, there is no need to incur the cost of 
signaling. As a result, the unconstrained-effi cient allocation 
is obtained.
References
Andolfatto, D., Nosal, E., Wallace, N., 2007. The role of 
independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig Model. Journal 
of Economic Theory 137, 709-715.
Diamond, D.W., Dybvig, P.H., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance 
and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401-419.
Ennis, H., Keister, T., 2009a. Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils 
of Intervention. American Economic Review 99, 1588-1607.
Ennis, H., Keister, T., 2009b. Run Equilibria in the Green-Lin Model 
of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 
1996-2020.
Friedman, M., Schwartz, A.J., 1971. Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960, Princeton University Press; New Ed edition 
(November 1, 1971).
Green, E.J., Lin, P., 2000. Diamond and Dybvig’s Classic Theory of 
Financial Intermediation: What’s Missing?. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 24, 3-13.
Green, E.J., Lin, P., 2003. Implementing effi cient allocations in a 
model of fi nancial intermediation, Journal of Economic Theory 
109, 1-23.
Gu, C., 2010. Herding and Bank Runs, forthcoming. Journal of 
Economic Theory.
Iyer, R., Puri, M., 2008. Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance 
of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks, NBER Working 
Paper No. 14280.
Nosal, E., Wallace, N., 2009. Information Revelation in the 
Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model. Policy Discussion Paper Series, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Peck, J., Shell, K., 2003. Equilibrium Bank Runs, Journal of Political 
Economy 111, 103-123.
Sprague, O.M., 1910. History Of Crises under the National Banking 
System. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce.
Starr, M.A., Yilmaz, R., 2007. Bank Runs in Emerging-Market 
Economies: Evidence from Turkey’s Special Finance Houses, 
Southern Economic Journal 73, 1112-1132.
Wallace, N., 1988. Another Attempt to Explain an Illiquid Banking 
System: The Diamond and Dybvig Model with Sequential Service 
Taken Seriously. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly 
Review.
Wicker, E., 2001. The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. 
Cambridge University Press (March 2001).
